Michigan Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 6

1958

Criminal Law - Evidence - Wiretapping
James A. Park
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Evidence Commons, Fourth
Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. Park, Criminal Law - Evidence - Wiretapping, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1022 (1958).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss6/13

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1022

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 56

CRIMINAL LAw-EvmENcE-WIRETAPPING-Suspecting that petitioner and
others were violating state narcotics laws, New York police tapped petition~
er's telephone pursuant to a warrant obtained in accordance ·with New
York -law.1 Acting upon information thus gained the police apprehended
petitioner's brother. In his possession was· found, not the narcotics as·
suspected, but alcohol without the tax stamps required by federal law.2
This evidence was turned over to federal authorities. Prosecution for
possessing and transporting distilled spirits without tax stamps thereon
followed, during which petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence·
obtained through the wiretap ·was denied. The Second Circuit affirmed·
the conviction,8 holding that although the evidence was obtained in
violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,4 it was
~dmissible. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Evidence obtained solely by state agents in violation of section
605 is inadmissible in federal courts. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S.
96 (1957). .
.
In a companion case, a person expecting a threatening telephone call
from petitioner requested state police to listen in over a regularly installed
extension telephone. They did so, and the testimony of those officers as to
the conversation was admitted on the petitioner's trial for violating
federal law.5 His conviction was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.6 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two justices
dissenting. 7 Section 605 was not violated because there was no "interception" within the meaning of the statute. Thus the testimony was
admissible. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
Section 605 is essentially a proscriptive pro~ion, forbidding the interception and divulgence of a communication. It can be criminally8 and
civilly9 enforced. The plain language of the second clause10 renders it
naturally suitable as an exclusionary rule of evidence.11 As a rule of
evidence, it does not supersede contrary state rules in state court proceed-

lN.Y. CoNsr., Art. I, §12; N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §813-a (1942).
In violation of LR.C., §§5008(b)(l) and 5642.
United States v. Benanti, (2d Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 389.
4 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §605.
5 Rathbun was convicted of transmitting a threatening interstate communication
in violation of 18 U.S.C. (1952) §875(b) and (c).
6 Rathbun v. United States, (10th Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 514.
7 Justice Frankfurter and Douglas argued that there was an "interception" unauthorized by "the sender."
8 United States v. Gruber, (2d Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 307.
9 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 691.
10 "[N]o person not being authorized by -the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person. • • ."
11 Section 605 was originally applied as a rule of evidence in Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
2
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ings.12 Its application in federal courts, however, prohibits both testimony as to the substance of an intercepted message18 and evidence obtained
as the "fruit" of such an interception, at least when the existence of the
wiretap has been disclosed.14 The exclusionary rule applies to intrastate
as well as interstate messages.1is
In deciding the Benanti case below,16 the Second Circuit approved the
evidence offered, relying on a Supreme Court intimation that evidence
obtained in violation of section 605 should be accorded the same treatment as evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.17 It
was reasoned that Fourth Amendment considerations18 apparently permit
the introduction in a federal prosecution of evidence obtained solely
by state authorities in a search and seizure unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment,19 at least where federal officers do not cooperate,20
and when the search is not solely to enforce federal law.21 Since neither of
these latter two considerations was present it followed that state-secured
evidence obtained in violation of section 605 should also be admissible,
and sixteen decisions, in seven of which certiorari had been denied, were
cited to that effect. The Court nevertheless found the statute to require
a contrary result, and went out of its way to observe: "It has remained an
open question in this Court whether evidence obtained solely by state

12 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). But see Matter of Interception of Telephone
Communications, 170 N.Y. S. (2d) 84 (1958), where a memorandum opinion apprised
enforcement and prosecuting officers that authorizing orders for wiretapping within
New York would henceforth be denied notwithstanding the state statute. The court
based its decision on a .holding that the Benanti case and §605 are the supreme law
of the land. The court says, "[Benanti] tolls the knell of all wiretapping, including
so-called 'legal' wiretapping, in our State.'' People v. Dinan, 172 N.Y.S. (2d) 496 (1958), •
where a lower New York court indicates that -Benanti may ·have changed the result on
the Schwartz facts; Burack v. State Liquor Authority, (E.D. N.Y. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 161,
where the federal court relied upon Benanti to enjoin the use of state wiretap evidence
before a state administrative tribunal.
13 Nardone v. United States, note 11 supra.
14 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). But see the Benanti case at 100,
note 5.
111 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
16 Benanti v. United States, note 3 supra.
17 "Although the unlawful interception of a telephone communication does not
amount to a search or seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, we have applied
the same policy in respect of the prohibitions of the Federal Communications Act. • • .''
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 at 120 (1942).
18 It is generally assumed that the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), is not required by the Fourth Amendment, although this question
remains open. See Justice Black's concurring opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 at 39 and 40 (1949).
19 See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74 (1949). The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures although not the
Weeks exclusionary rule have been read into the Fourteenth Amendment as restrictions
on the states. Wolf v. Colorado, note 18 supra.
20 See Byars v. United States, note 19 supra; Lustig v. United States, note 19 supra.
21 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
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agents in an illegal search may be admissible in federal court despite the
Fourth Amendment."213 Therefore the real significance of the Benanti
case may be to portend a change in the previously understood scope of
the Fourth Amendment.
Section 605 clearly condemns the "interception" and _divulgence of a
communication, unless authorized by "the sender."22 Prior to the Rathbun
case, lower federal courts had indicated that both parties to a telephone
conversation were alternately senders and receivers, and that authorization
by both was therefore necessary to remove an interception from the proscription of the statute.23 Other lower courts had indicated that where a third
party overhears a conversation on an extension telephone with the consent
of one party, there is no "interception" within the meaning of the statute.24
The Court accepted the latter position, therefore avoiding the problem of
who is a "sender," arguing that Congress could not have intended that
the word "interception" included the normal business and social practice
of allowing third parties to listen in on extension telephones.25 This result
seems sound. Since the recipient of the phone call here could testify to
its contents, keeping a police officer who overheard the conversation from
testifying would only prevent corroboration of the recipient's testimony, and
could not prevent disclosure of the contents of the,conversation.26 This same
consideration would suggest that evidence obtained with consent of one
party by use of a device other than an extension telephone should also
be admissible. If' such a device were used, however, the Court might have
more difficulty in finding no "interception," and would then face the
problem of who is a "sender."27 Finding any listening-in consented to by
either party to the conversation, regardless of the method used, not to be
an "interception" would avoid this problem, and would seem to be both
a permissible and desirable construction of the statute.
The two cases seem to complement each other. Benanti protects the
individual from invasion of the privacy of his telecommunications by state
agents, at least to the extent that federal exclusionary rules of evidence
may do so. Rathbun, however, makes clear that such protection will be
accorded only in cases where the individual's privacy is in fact threatened

21aBenanti case at 102, note 10.
22 Note 10 supra.
23 E.g., United States v. Polakoff, (2d Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 888; United States v. Hill,
(S.D. N.Y. 1957) 149 F. Supp. 83.
24 E.g., United States v. White, (7th Cir. 1956) 228 F. (2d) 832; Flanders v. United
States, (6th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 163.
25 Rathbun case at 109 to 111.
26 It is assumed that a caller or recipient of a call who would request the police to
listen in on a conversation would also be willing to testify in court, although •the same
rule should follow even if he would not do so because of, for example, fear or intimidation.
21 Section 605 incorporated into the Federal Communications Act the almost identical
provision found in the Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44-2 Stat. 1172, thus explaining the
presence of the words "sender" and "intercept."
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by the wiretap, which is not normally the case when state police are requested to monitor the conversation by the other party, who can testify to
its contents.28 The results in both cases, therefore, can be commended.

James A. Park

2s See note 26 supra.

